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Outlook 
and  
appraisal 
Overview 
 
 
 
The basic picture continues to be one of 
weak recovery with a further weakening 
apparent towards the end of 2011, as the UK 
economy contracted by 0.2%. Scottish GDP 
is still -3.3%% below the pre-recession peak 
nearly four years ago, while the figure for UK 
GVA is -3.6%. However, while the depth of 
the recession was greater in the UK, at  
-7.2%, than in Scotland, -5.9%, the recovery 
of UK GDP has been slightly faster than in 
Scotland. The National Institute in London 
has noted that the time taken in returning to 
the pre-recession peak is now greater than in 
the Great Depression in the 1930s. Our new 
forecast suggests that overall Scottish GDP 
will not return to its pre-recession peak - the 
level of GDP the economy was at just  before 
it went into recession - until the third quarter 
of 2014, just in time for the Commonwealth 
Games in Glasgow (23rd July to 3rd August 
2014). That is, six years after the recession 
began. 
 
The labour market in Scotland is now clearly 
weaker than the UK. Recent employment 
losses have taken the Scottish jobs market to 
a position 3.9% below its pre-recession 
employment peak. This is not that much 
different from the trough of the recession 
after employment had fallen by -4.8%. The 
UK jobs market is in contrast creating net 
jobs, all be it slowly and at an insufficient rate 
to stop unemployment rising. The result is 
that employment in the UK is now only  
-1.38% below its pre-recession employment 
peak. Of course that in itself is nothing to be 
complacent about since recession in the UK 
labour market began four years ago. 
Moreover, the situation in the Scottish labour 
market is worse than that implied by the 
employment figures. This is because the 
supply of labour is rising as working 
population increases. An examination of the 
amount of jobs on offer compared to the 
available labour supply reveals that the 
situation is now identical to the trough of the 
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recession. Hence unemployment has been 
rising strongly recently to 231,247 or 8.6% 
and above the UK rate of 8.4%. The number 
unemployed is very close to number reached 
at the trough of the recession in May-July 
2010 when unemployment reached 236,819. 
Within that total more than 100,000 young 
people are estimated to be unemployed. This 
is a personal and social tragedy, which on 
most people's values should produce the 
strongest policy response. Moreover, it is 
also an economic tragedy because of the risk 
that a generation of employees may lose, or 
fail to gain, key employment skills that would 
be of significant productive use to the 
economy. Potential output will fall. 
 
On a brighter note, the weakening in growth 
in the economy towards the end of last year 
does not appear to be as bad as many 
feared. There are some indications that 
growth is beginning to pick up and after a 
weak first six months growth may pick up 
towards the end of the year. The rate of 
inflation is falling as last year's VAT increase 
falls out of the statistic and the rise in import 
prices especially commodities and energy 
costs have moderated. Although the recent 
rise again in the price of oil to above $120 
per barrel, driven by events in Iran, leads one 
to be cautious about the prospect for a rapid 
fall in inflation. The mainstream view is that a 
lowering of the inflation rate back to target 
will give a relative boost to real incomes and 
so encourage a rise in household demand. 
But this view might be misplaced. If the 
pressing need of households is to pay down 
debt and present real incomes mean that 
there actual saving is below the 
precautionary saving desired to pay down 
debt. Then a rise in real income could lead to 
higher savings with little or no impact on 
household demand. Let us hope it is the 
former rather than the latter. 
 
The situation in the Eurozone remains the 
'elephant in the room' as regards future 
growth prospects but the problem has eased 
for two reasons. First, the agreement 
secured by EZ finance ministers on the 
much-postponed €130bn second bail-out for 
Greece. Secondly, the role the ECB has 
recently played in acting as de facto lender of 
last resort. By buying securities from EZ 
banks the banks have been able to use the 
increased liquidity to fund some of the debt 
of the peripheral sovereigns. These 
developments offer only temporary respite to 
the EZ balance of payments and debt crisis. 
But there is still a risk of a disorderly Greek 
default and exit from the EZ, which will put at 
risk some of the other sovereigns such as 
Portugal and Spain. Moreover, the balance 
of payments financing and adjustment issues 
have hardly been tackled even if some 
progress has been made on debt. 
 
Against this back ground we have revised 
down our forecast of GDP growth for 2012 to 
0.4% from 0.9%. But we expect growth to be 
a little stronger in 2013 at 1.7% instead of 
1.6%. By 2014 we predict a stronger 
recovery with growth of 2.6% taking us back 
to that pre-recession GDP peak by the third 
quarter. We expect Scottish growth to 
continue to be weaker than the UK but 
growth in the two jurisdictions is now 
expected to be much closer together, in line 
with the evidence from the recovery to date. 
 
For employment, our central forecast is for 
net jobs to fall by -1.8% in 2011, and by  
-0.7% in 2012, rising by 1.0% in 2013 and by 
1.7% in 2014. The number of employee jobs 
in Scotland is forecast to decline during 2012 
by just less than 16,000 jobs. Through 2013 
and 2014 we forecast increases in employee 
jobs in our central forecast, with annual 
increases of over 23 thousand and 38 
thousand respectively. There are job 
increases across all the main sectors. 
However, we forecast a “rebalancing” of 
employment within the service sectors 
towards non-public activities as fiscal 
consolidation continues. Construction 
employment is forecast to increase in 2013 
and 2014 as spending on (private) 
investment projects returns with renewed 
confidence in the recovery. 
 
Unemployment is forecast to continue to rise 
on both key measures this year. On the 
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Figure 1:  Scottish and UK Quarterly GDP Growth 
 
 
Figure 2:  GVA in recession and recovery Scotland and UK to 2011q3 (Relative to pre-recession peak)  
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preferred ILO measure unemployment is 
predicted to reach 265,250 by the end of this 
year, or 9.8%. That is a rise of 34 thousand 
from the level reached at the end of 2011. As 
with our last forecast, we are expecting the 
unemployment position to improve through 
2013, and are now forecasting unemploy-
ment at the end of that year of 253,950, 
9.3%, falling further to 234,300, 8.8%, by the 
end of 2014. 
 
Recent GDP performance 
GDP grew by 0.5% in the third quarter identical to UK 
growth, compared to 0.2% in both the second and first 
quarters - see Figure 1. Over the year, GDP grew by less in 
Scotland, 0.9%, than in the UK 1.3%. It is also evident from 
Figure 1 that since the recession the Scottish economy has 
tracked the UK economy more closely than before. 
 
While this rate of growth is close to the trend rate of growth 
it is weak for the recovery phase of the business cycle. It is 
suggested by the National Institute for Economic and Social 
Research (NIESR), through their Director Jonathan Portes, 
that the time taken in returning to the pre-recession peak is 
now greater than in the Great Depression in the 1930s. 
 
Figure 2 shows that Scottish GVA now stands at -3.3% 
below the pre-recession peak nearly four years ago, while 
the figure for UK GVA is -3.6%. However, although the 
depth of the recession was greater in the UK, at -7.2%, than 
in Scotland, -5.9%, the recovery of UK GDP has been 
slightly faster than in Scotland. 
 
At the broad sectoral level, services (0.9%) and 
manufacturing (0.6%) were the main drivers of third quarter 
growth. Indeed, the Scottish performance was stronger than 
in UK services (0.7%) and UK manufacturing (0.1%).  
 
So, some comfort from a Scottish standpoint can be drawn 
from the latest data. But the performance of both services 
and manufacturing was weaker in Scotland over the year. 
The UK service sector grew by 1.2% over the year but 
Scottish services could only manage 0.3%. This underlines 
the weakness of the recovery in Scottish services, which is 
revealed in Figure 5. 
 
Despite experiencing a smaller drop in output in the 
recession of -4.7% compared to a fall of -5.4% in the UK 
service sector, Scottish services GVA was still -2.8% below 
its pre-recession peak compared to -1.8% in the UK. Figure 
6 charts recession and recovery in manufacturing. As with 
services the loss of output in recession was less than in the 
UK, but the recovery has been weak but comparable. GVA 
in manufacturing dropped by -10.1% in Scotland compared 
to -13.4% in the UK. In the most recent quarter manu-
facturing GVA in Scotland stood at -5.2% below its pre-
recession peak compared to -7.3% in the UK. A driver of the 
recovery in manufacturing is exports, which appears to have 
faltered in 2011. Manufacturing exports grew by 0.2 per cent 
in real terms during the third quarter of 2011. But this 
represented a weaker performance than the second quarter, 
which in turn was weaker than the first quarter. 
 
The construction sector was much weaker in Scotland in the 
third quarter contracting by -1.2% compared to an increase 
of 0.3% in the UK - see Figure 7. It is worth noting, though, 
that over the year the performance of Scottish construction 
was slightly better with growth of 5.9% compared to 5.4% in 
the UK. Figure 8 shows that the picture during the recession 
and recovery is more complicated. The drop in output in the 
recession was large and identical in Scotland and the UK at 
-18.3%. But Scottish construction bounced back more 
strongly than its UK counterpart, then contracted for 4 
successive quarters, while UK construction contracted for 2 
quarters and then grew over the last 2 quarters. The result 
was that by 2011q3, construction GVA in Scotland and the 
UK was broadly in the same place in relation to its pre-
recession peak, at -6.9%. 
 
Within services, the most important sector by contribution to 
GDP, business and financial services - 26% of overall GDP 
and 36% of service sector GVA - grew by 2.3% in Scotland 
and 1.2% in the UK during the latest quarter. However, over 
the year the sector contracted by -0.3% in Scotland but 
grew by 1.9% in the UK. Figure 9 shows the path of GVA in 
the sector during the recession and recovery relative to its 
pre-recession peak. What is clear from the chart is the 
greater recession in Scotland and weaker recovery. GVA fell 
by -7.0% in UK business and financial services during the 
recession whereas in Scotland the contraction was -9.8%. 
By the latest quarter the sector in the UK was -3.2% below 
its pre-recession peak while its Scottish counterpart was  
-6.5% below, which is not much different from the trough of 
the recession in the sector in the UK. Elsewhere in services 
Distribution, Hotels and Catering grew more quickly in 
Scotland in both the recent quarter and over the year. 
Growth was 0.7% in the quarter compared to 0.2% in the 
UK, while over the year the Scottish sector grew by 2.6% 
while its UK counterpart grew by 0.3%. In contrast, both 
Transport, Storage, Information & Communication and 
Government & Other Services grew more quickly in the UK. 
The Transport et al sector contracted by -0.3% in the 
quarter while the sector in the UK grew by 0.3%. Over the 
year, the sector contracted by -0.8% in Scotland while 
expanding by 1.3% in the UK. Similarly, in the government & 
other services sector growth was flat in the quarter but was 
positive at 0.6% in the UK. Over the year, the sector was 
largely stagnant in Scotland with growth of only 0.1% but 
exhibited growth of 1% in the UK. These slower rates of 
growth of government activity are likely in part to reflect the 
strengthening of the programme of fiscal consolidation.  
 
For analysis of developments within manufacturing, we only 
have data on the Scottish economy. There are currently no 
UK figures on a directly comparable basis. That said, the  
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Figure 3:  Scottish and UK Services GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2011q3 
 
 
Figure 4:  Scottish and UK Manufacturing GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2011q3 
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Figure 5:  Services: Recession and Recovery to 2011q3 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Manufacturing: Recession and Recovery to 2011q3  
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Figure 7:  Scottish and UK Construction GVA Volume Growth 1998q2 - 2011q3 
 
 
 
main sectors driving manufacturing growth of 0.9% in the 
third quarter were Engineering & Allied and Food & Drink, 
with growth of 1% and 1.9%, respectively. The Metals sector 
grew strongly with GVA rising by 3% during the quarter. 
However, metals accounts for half the weight of the other 
two sectors. Most of the main manufacturing sectors grew 
quite strongly over the year, which hopefully augurs well for 
future growth. Figure 10 shows the growth performance of 
manufacturing exports over the past eight years. The 
quarterly data are smoothed as a four-quarter moving 
average to remove some of the quarterly fluctuations to 
which the series is prone, in part because of the 'lumpy' 
nature of export orders and sales (The series is already 
seasonally adjusted.) Recovery from recession is clearly 
evident but the faltering nature of the recovery is also clear. 
 
The labour market 
The latest labour market data for the Scottish economy were 
not encouraging. However, the picture for the UK labour 
market was a little brighter. Unemployment (on the preferred 
ILO measure) rose during the final quarter of 2011 by 
16,000 to 231,247 or 8.6%, higher than the UK rate of 8.4%. 
This figure is close to the recession peak of unemployment 
in May-July 2010 when unemployment reached 236,819. 
For a detailed consideration of the Scottish labour market 
see Overview of the Labour Market in this Commentary 
below. 
 
Employment fell by 20,000 to take the Scottish jobs market 
to a position 3.9% below its pre-recession employment peak 
- see Figure 11. This is not that much different from the 
trough of the recession after employment had fallen by  
-4.8%. The position in the UK on the jobs front is better, 
however. Net jobs were created during Oct-Dec, by 60,000 
even though unemployment rose by 48,000. The inactivity 
rate also fell quite markedly in the UK whereas in Scotland 
there was only a slight fall.  
 
All this suggests that with more encouraging data on the 
output front, the UK labour market might be beginning to 
turn round although unemployment may rise for a little while 
yet. This does not disguise the fact that unemployment 
remains high by historical standards. Jonathan Portes, 
Director of NIESR, demonstrates that the 'unemployment 
gap' between actual unemployment and the rate of 
unemployment that is estimated to be associated with non-
accelerating inflation is exceptionally high and of long 
duration by historical standards. The 'unemployment gap' if 
positive indicates the amount of unemployment due to a 
deficiency of demand and hence a failure of macro-
economic management. With a large element of this gap 
being made up of 'youth' unemployment - more than 
100,000 estimated in Scotland - the risk of hysteresis, with a 
generation of employees losing, or failing to gain, key 
employment skills, is high. 
 
In Scotland, the labour market is now clearly weaker than 
the UK. There is no better indicator of this than a 
comparison of the amount of employment on offer with the 
available labour supply. As Figure 12 reveals the amount of 
jobs on offer compared to the available labour supply is now 
identical to the trough of the recession. 
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Figure 8: Construction: Recession and Recovery to 2011q3  
 
 
 
Given that the growth of output remains weak it is likely that 
unemployment will continue to rise in Scotland for some 
time yet. Moreover, Scotland's position compared to the 
other regions of the UK, which has also been weakening, 
may continue to worsen - see Figure 13. 
 
Re-balancing the Scottish economy 
The shock to the economy of the Great Recession 
continues to reverberate. Not only has the recovery been 
weak, there are fears that a large proportion of supply has 
been permanently lost, and that there has been a desired 
permanent shift in the composition of demand away from 
one set of productive activities to another set. There are 
activities such as investment banking, containing both 
tradable and non-tradable elements - see below, which it is 
arguable have been permanently reduced in the UK 
following the boom and slump. In general terms, the IMF 
has found that downturns associated with significant 
disruption to the financial sector are often characterised by 
large and persistent output losses
1
. 
  
On the demand-side, Ben Broadbent – External Member of 
the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) - 
has argued that the large fall in sterling in 2007-08 
“...reflects the need to rebalance UK supply – away from 
non traded goods and services, and towards the production 
of tradables – in order to match an equivalent shift in the 
composition of demand”
2
. Broadbent's argument is that first, 
debt financed spending on housing, in particular, and 
perhaps other forms of property, has fallen for the 
foreseeable future. In addition, the loss of tax revenues as a 
result of the recession has been significant. Broadbent 
points out that tax revenues in 2009-10 were £109bn lower 
than expected in early 2007, equal to almost a third of 
current government spending on public services. The  
government has started a major and seemingly permanent 
cutback in government consumption, rightly or wrongly, as a 
result of the loss of tax revenues and rising debt. The main 
impact of this lowered spending will be on the demand for 
non-tradables. While in the short-to-medium term the 
government sees switching from public to private demand, 
household to export demand, and consumption to 
investment demand, there is a sense that, in the longer 
term, the required sustained switch is one from non-
tradables to tradables. Exports, in particular, will have to 
play a greater role in the growth of both UK and Scottish 
economies. 
 
To the extent this argument is correct, the future course of 
the economy i.e. growth and its composition, will depend on 
how successful and how quickly the economy can adjust 
away from the non-tradable activities that are less in 
demand towards tradable activities. And the most important 
tradable activities are manufacturing and tradable business 
and financial services. 
. 
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Figure 9:  Business & Financial Services: Recession and Recovery to 2011q3 
 
 
 
Figure 10:  Scottish Manufacturing Export Growth 2003 to 2011 - Percent, four quarter moving average  
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Figure 11:  Scottish and UK jobs, 16 and over, compared to pre-recession peak 
 
   
 
Figure 12:  Scottish Employment to Working Population ratio compared to pre-recession peak in April-June 
2007 to Oct-Dec 2011  
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All this begs several questions when it comes to Scotland. 
First, what evidence is there on changes in the demand and 
supply for non-tradables and tradables as a consequence of 
the recession in Scotland, both absolutely and relative to the 
rest of the UK? Secondly, what are the prospects for the 
growth of the Scottish tradables sector in the medium to 
long-term? 
 
Data are limited but we do have the latest ONS Regional 
activity data that were published in mid December. The 
Regional Accounts data provide information on sectoral 
GVA up to 2009 and overall 'regional' GVA to 2010. Figure 
14 shows the sectoral GVA shares before - 2007 - and 
during/after the recession - 2009 -  in Scotland. 
 
Figure 14 offers some support for the view that switching 
between non-tradables and tradables began during the 
recession. Of the typical non-tradable sectors, construction's 
share of Scottish GVA dropped from 9.1% to 7.4%, 
wholesale and retail etc, dropped marginally from 10.1% to 
10%, real estate activities fell from 7.5% to 6.5%, and 
transportation and storage reduced its share from 5% to 
4.8%. However, public sector activities that embrace the 
three sectors, Human health etc, Education, and Public 
Administration etc., increased their share of GVA slightly 
between 2007 and 2009 from 21.3% to 22.8%. The rise in 
public non-tradable activities would appear to be the 
inevitable initial consequence of a private sector recession. 
The government maintained its own demand in the 
recession as it traditionally now does. But once fiscal 
consolidation finally works through then it is likely that the 
share of public sector activities will fall. 
 
Turning now to the largely tradable activities, there is some 
suggestion of rising GVA shares, although by 2009 the 
increase was small. Manufacturing's share of overall GVA 
rose from 11.5% to 11.9% and this despite a large drop in 
real manufacturing GVA as measured by the Scottish 
government's own GVA index. Also, the share of financial 
services and insurance in overall GVA rose from 7.1% to 
9%. This is in many respects surprising, given the source of 
the recession in a banking crisis, where one might have 
expected demand to fall disproportionately in financial 
services and perhaps even some supply to have been lost. 
The rise in the share might indicate that the effects of a 
relative price shift in demand towards tradable elements of 
financial services outweighed the income effect in reducing 
demand but I doubt it. What needs to be allowed for is the 
extent to which the sector was able to maintain and increase 
its 'market' share by raising prices. It is possible that the lack 
of competition in the sector, particularly in areas such as 
business finance, enabled this to happen. It certainly chimes 
with anecdotal evidence about the behaviour of the banks 
during and after the recession in terms of charges for new 
lending and re-financing. Moreover, the rise in the share of 
financial services following the recession was not simply a 
Scottish phenomenon and was evident right across the UK 
as Figure 15 shows. 
 
In contrast, the rise in the share of manufacturing in overall 
GVA was much more a Scottish phenomenon. Indeed, as 
Figure 16 shows, the share of manufacturing in UK GVA fell 
between 2007 and 2009, from 11% to 10.3%. 
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Only in Scotland and Northern Ireland did the manufacturing 
share of GVA rise. But in regions such as the North East 
and the West Midlands, the drop in the manufacturing share 
was large from 15.3% to 13.2% in the former and 14.6% to 
12.8% in the latter. 
 
So, we have tried to offer some answers to our first 
question: what evidence is there on changes in the demand 
and supply for non-tradables and tradables as a 
consequence of the recession in Scotland, both absolutely 
and relative to the rest of the UK? The evidence appears to 
show that a shift in demand away from non-tradables 
towards tradables has occurred. However, there is clear 
evidence of a relative fall in some non-tradable sectors but 
weaker evidence of a relative rise in sectors considered to 
be largely tradable. The picture appears also to be confused 
by the income effect of the recession, which caused 
demand to fall for all goods and services, although the 
incidence of the drop in demand varied across sectors. 
What we can say is that manufacturing, the principal traded 
sector, held up relatively well in Scotland. This could mean 
that, in answer to our second question, the Scottish 
economy may be well placed to take advantage of the 
expected sustained switch in demand in favour of tradables 
in the future. 
  
However, the prospects depend on the supply response of 
the Scottish economy. That is, how easily the economy 
allows existing resources to switch from non-tradable 
activities in reduced demand, along with the allocation of 
new resources, to manufacturing. We saw above that while 
manufacturing exports from Scotland are recovering the 
recovery to date is fitful.  
 
We have undertaken a detailed analysis of Scottish exports 
over the past 10 years using data from the recently 
published Global Connections Survey, the Index of 
Manufacturing Exports, and the Scottish Input-Output 
tables. Some of the results from this exercise are presented 
in Box 1 of the Forecasts of the Scottish economy section in 
this Commentary below. What this analysis suggests, in 
broad terms, is that the rest of the UK (RUK) became more 
important as an export destination and service sector 
exports rose as a proportion of total exports and so 
increased in importance relative to manufacturing. However, 
these findings need to be hedged with one or two 
qualifications.  
 
First, the growth in importance of RUK exports as a 
proportion of total exports reflected the strong growth in 
service and financial service sector exports up to 2007 just 
prior to the start of the recession. Between 2008 and 2010, 
the annual rate of growth of total exports declined 
considerably from the period 2002 to 2007. This was very  
Figure 13:  Unemployment rate % (ILO measure) UK Regions Oct-Dec 2011 
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much the result of a drop in exports to RUK, which fell from 
9.9% per annum to 0.6% per annum, still managing some 
positive growth
3
. Exports to the rest of the world (ROW), in 
contrast, went from -0.5% annual growth in 2002-07 to -
0.6% in 2008-10, i.e. they were falling over the whole 
period. 
 
Secondly, we cannot get a proper appreciation of the 
underlying performance of manufacturing exports and 
contribution to exports as a whole, unless we remove the 
electronics sector. Because of the world-wide recession in 
ICT in 2000 and thereafter, electronics production in 
Scotland halved and the sector's contribution to exports fell 
considerably. With the removal of electronics, the annual 
growth rate of manufacturing exports to RUK pre-recession 
and then during recession falls from 4.0% per annum to 
1.4%. Over the same period service sector exports to RUK 
fell from 13.4% per annum to -0.9%. So exports of 
manufactures (ex electronics), and manufacturing overall, to 
RUK held up better than service exports. Moreover, 
manufacturing (ex electronics) exports to ROW were 
growing quite strongly in the pre-recession period by 4.4% 
per annum but less than service exports to ROW, which 
grew strongly by 8.9% per annum. In the recession 
manufacturing exports (ex electronics) fell to -1.4% per 
annum while service exports to ROW although contracting 
considerably managed to record some positive growth of 
1.4% per annum. 
So, we can conclude by making the following points:  
 
 It appears likely that the future growth of the 
Scottish economy will depend more on tradables 
than non-tradables than it has done in the past. 
Policy needs to recognise this. Although, recent 
evidence suggests that the rebalancing process is 
already underway.  
 
 The growing importance of tradable service exports 
suggests that export promotion policies should not 
simply assume that manufacturing is the only 
source of strong export growth.  
 
 Equally, the weak performance of Scottish exports 
to the ROW and the weak performance of 
manufacturing exports within that total, should not 
produce a counsel of despair. 
 
 The weak Scottish export performance to ROW 
over the past 8 to 10 years is mainly down to the 
significant loss of electronics production at the 
beginning of the period and the effects of recession 
at the end of the period.  
 
 Policy needs to recognise the importance of the 
RUK market as a legitimate target for 'export' 
promotion policy.  
Figure 14:  Sectoral Shares (%) of Scottish GVA: 2007 and 2009  
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Figure 15: Financial Sector GVA Shares in UK Regions before and in recession, 2007 and 2009  
 
 
Figure 16:  Manufacturing GVA Shares UK Regions 2007 and 2009  
 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
Finance & Insurance Share 2007
Finance & Insurance Share 2009
Vol.35 No.3, pp.4-21. 
 
 
 
 
 However, the continuing weakness of UK 
household demand might also suggest that the 
recent shift in the balance of exports in favour of 
the rest of the UK could hamper the necessary 
rebalancing of Scottish industry in favour of the 
production of tradables and exports. 
 
Forecasts 
 
Background 
Real GDP in the UK economy contracted by 0.2% in the 
final three months of last year. A key question is whether 
this fall in GDP is a portent of worse to come, or will this 
weakening in an already weak recovery be temporary? The 
question cannot be answered with much certainty. As we 
noted above GDP is around 4% below its pre-recession 
peak. It is the production sector and construction that is 
displaying the greatest weakness, with manufacturing  
(-0.9% in the quarter) contributing most to the decline, while 
the service sector slowly recovers. But mining and quarrying 
also contracted by -1.1% in the quarter and the ONS cites 
the drop in North Sea Oil production as a key factor. Indeed, 
the sustained weakness of oil production in the UK is shown 
to be a contributory factor in the weakening UK trade 
position. The near term prospects for production output, 
which contributes 15% to overall UK GDP do not look 
promising. Most of the broad product groupings are either 
exhibiting a downward trend or flat growth. Moreover, both 
consumer durable and non-durables are contributing little to 
growth, with no sign of an upturn. This clearly reflects the 
state of UK consumer demand as households continue to 
pay down debt and deal with declining real incomes. 
 
The situation in services in the UK is a little more 
reassuring. The performance of business services & finance 
is encouraging and should support future growth. But with 
fiscal consolidation beginning to bite the still positive 
contribution to growth from Government & other services 
might be expected to diminish.  
 
We noted above that the recovery was meant to be based 
on a switch from domestic to external sales, from 
consumption to investment, and from public to private 
activity. There is little evidence of this occurring much in the 
latest statistics. What the outturn data suggest is that we 
might expect to see more negative GDP growth in the UK in 
the first half of this year, or at best stagnation. But it is not all 
gloom. Net jobs are being created in the UK labour market 
even though unemployment and particularly youth 
unemployment is unforgivably high. The rate of inflation is 
falling as last year's VAT increase falls out of the statistic 
and the rise in import prices especially commodities and 
energy costs have moderated. Although the recent rise 
again in the price of oil to above $120 per barrel, driven by 
events in Iran, leads one to be cautious about the prospect 
for a rapid fall in inflation. Moreover, while the mainstream 
view is that a fall in the inflation rate back to target will give a 
relative boost to real incomes and so encourage a rise in 
13.7
15.3
14.6
11.5
11.0
15.2
13.2
12.8
11.9
10.3
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
18.0
Manufacturing Share 2007
Manufacturing Share 2009
Vol.35 No.3, pp.4-21. 
 
household demand, the view might be misplaced. If the 
pressing need of households is to pay down debt and 
present real incomes mean that there actual saving is below 
the precautionary saving desired to pay down debt. Then a 
rise in real income could lead to higher savings with little or 
no impact on household demand. Nevertheless, if this is any 
comfort, the latest Markit Household Finance Index shows 
household finances still worsening but deteriorating at their 
slowest rate since December 2010. The survey also 
suggests that household debt may have stabilised, which I 
assume means has stopped rising. 
 
Other UK survey evidence is a little more encouraging. The 
Markit/CIPS UK Services PMI showed that UK service 
sector growth improved in January to the strongest level 
since March last year. New orders were up and business 
orders rose considerably leading Markit's Chief Economist 
Chris Williamson to comment that "... (t)he surprisingly 
strong upturn in the service sector follows a similar 
improvement in manufacturing and ongoing growth in 
construction, which all points to a resounding revival of UK 
economic growth in January. The situation is certainly a lot 
brighter than seen in the final quarter of last year, when the 
economy contracted 0.2%, and a slide back into recession 
is now looking increasingly unlikely." 
 
However, we would still argue that the scale and speed of 
the UK Coalition's fiscal austerity programme is a mistake, 
and that there is sufficient 'fiscal capacity' to slow the 
process down. We are not alone in this view. For example, 
the Oxford macro-economist Simon Wren Lewis argues that 
"the speed of fiscal tightening  .... is too rapid. In the UK in 
2010, for example, there was a clear risk that private sector 
demand would not pick up in 2011. The risk coming from the 
Eurozone was also apparent. In these circumstances, the 
prudent policy option was not to scale back public spending 
too rapidly, because there was no insurance policy in place 
if these risks materialised. They did materialise, and UK 
growth stalled. The Eurozone is making exactly the same 
mistake, in perhaps a bigger way." 
4
 Wren Lewis then 
comments on the risks of rising debt and loss of market 
confidence "(O)ne simple point is worth making again and 
again. If the recession reflects additional net saving by the 
private sector, they want to hold more assets. Furthermore, 
given the character of the recession, they want to hold 
relatively safe assets. There is a literature on the current 
shortage of safe assets. Budget deficits provide those 
assets, but still interest rates on debt are falling outside the 
Eurozone because there are not enough of them. This too 
points to budget deficits being cut too quickly."
5 
 
The so-called 'elephant in the room' remains the situation in 
the Eurozone (EZ). On Tuesday 21st February, the EZ 
finance ministers secured agreement on a much-postponed 
€130bn second bail-out for Greece. This was secured after 
private holders of Greek bonds were cajoled into taking a 
greater loss of 53.5 per cent on the face value of their bond 
holdings compared to the 50 per cent agreed in October. In 
net present value terms the size of the 'haircut' amounts to a 
loss of 70%. The revised arrangements followed a report 
prepared for the EZ finance ministers which suggested that 
the current proposal would on a 'downside scenario' be 
likely to result in a Greek debt to GDP ratio 160 per cent by 
2020 instead of the desired 120 per cent. The figure of 120 
per cent is considered to be the maximum level that would 
make the Greek public finances sustainable. All the i's have 
not been dotted nor the t's crossed on the deal, so it could 
yet collapse.  
 
Moreover, one reason why the report considered that the 
previous proposal would not get the debt ratio to 120 per 
cent was the effect of austerity in lowering Greek GDP. This 
problem still remains and many economists believe that 
there is little likelihood of Greece getting on to a sustainable 
public finance track under the present strict austerity 
conditions required by the EZ. A disorderly default continues 
to have a high probability. In addition, it is very unlikely that 
austerity and the use of demand reduction to force an 
internal devaluation to improve Greek competitiveness will 
work at all. So, even if financing is delivered in the short-to 
medium term, the problem will return because of the lack of 
adjustment in the competitiveness of the Greek economy. 
Another reason why a Greek exit from the EZ has a high 
probability. Despite these caveats, the markets have given 
the EZ the benefit of the doubt and yields on the main 
peripheral country bonds have fallen over the last few 
weeks, helped considerably by the ECB's significant 
injection of liquidity into the banking system. The ECB has 
de facto been acting as a lender of last resort, with the 
banks using the increased liquidity to fund some of the debt 
of the peripheral sovereigns. The problems posed by the EZ 
member country balance of payments and debt crisis have 
eased, for the moment. 
 
Yet growth continues to be weak in the EZ and this amongst 
other factors is affecting growth in the Scottish economy. 
We noted in the previous Commentary that more than half 
of Scotland's exports outside the UK are to EU economies 
mostly within the EZ. In the present Commentary below in 
the section on the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy a 
weak growth forecast for the EZ is noted as well as the 
downside risk: a central forecast of 0% in 2012 and 1.4% in 
2013, with the downside scenario a forecast of -2.1% in 
2012 and -1.2% in 2013. It is noted that this is a remarkable 
range (2.6 percentage points in absolute terms) between the 
alternative scenarios at such a forecast horizon, and clearly 
highlights the risk to growth in the EZ if there is a major 
deterioration in the financial crisis. 
 
Scotland cannot help being touched by weak household 
spending in the rest of the UK as well as the deteriorating 
conditions in the EZ. Currently household spending in 
Scotland remains very weak, with wages increasing at 
below previous rates and a continued high rate of household 
savings. Prospects for investment growth in Scotland 
through the first half of 2012 also appear weak. For example 
the data on the growth of inventories growth in the UK 
suggests a lower rate of stock building in key sectors. 
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Government resource (current) spending is forecast to 
reduce in real terms over the next three years at an 
increasing rate as departmental cuts outlined in the CSR 
from Autumn 2010 are implemented. The IFS in January 
2012 outlined that some 88% of planned DEL reductions 
have yet to be implemented. This will continue to exert a 
downward pressure on domestic demand. Moreover, the 
data appear to suggest that government spending has fallen 
faster in real terms in Scotland than in the UK as a whole. 
 
The prospects for Scottish exports remain very uncertain. 
Growth prospects in the rest of the UK – Scotland’s largest 
export market – remain low. Scottish export prospects to the 
rest of the UK are strongly correlated with UK economic 
growth, so weak growth is likely to be bad for Scottish 
exports. Yet as the latest data from the CPB Netherlands 
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis show the growth of 
world trade may be picking up again after slowing for much 
of last year. But given that 67% of Scottish exports go to the 
rest of the UK it what happens to the growth of income there 
that really matters. 
 
Some light on the most recent performance of the Scottish 
 
Table 1:  Forecast Scottish GVA Growth, 2011-2014  
 
GVA Growth (% per annum) 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Central forecast 0.7 0.4 1.7 
 
2.6 
November forecast 0.4 0.9 1.6  na 
 
UK median independent new (February) 
 
Mean Absolute Error % points 
 
 
0.9 
 
+/- 0.153 
 
 
0.5 
 
+/- 0.548 
 
 
1.8 
 
+/- 1.216                   
 
 
 
 
economy can be shed from survey data - see Review of 
Business Surveys section below. Surveys of Scottish 
business up to January continued to highlight concerns 
about the implications of the sovereign debt crisis in the EZ. 
Business confidence was also dampened by continuing 
fears of recession in the UK and internationally, and fears 
about pressures on household spending.  However, the 
surveys since January particularly the UK wide surveys 
suggest that activity, may be beginning to pick up. We noted 
above the findings of the UK PMI for January which reported 
an increase in the service sector, at the fastest rate since 
March 2011. What remains unclear is whether this 
represents only a temporary improvement, as was the case 
last year in the first quarter which faded later in the year as 
the headwinds facing the UK economy became clearer, or 
represents the first signs of a more permanent upward 
trend. 
 
GVA Forecasts 
For our latest GVA forecasts we continue the presentational 
procedure adopted in the previous Commentary. We 
present only a central forecast but use estimated forecast 
errors to establish the likely range that the true first estimate 
of the growth of Scottish GVA will lie between. In this 
forecast, we extend the forecast horizon to include 2014 
 
Table 1 presents our forecasts for Scottish GVA - GDP at 
basic prices - for 2011 to 2014. The forecasts are presented 
in more detail in the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy 
section of this Commentary below. 
 
Table 1 shows that we have revised our forecast for all 
years. For 2011, we have raised our forecast from 0.4% to 
0.7%. The increase in output measured for the third quarter 
of 2011 was stronger than we expected (a 0.5% increase), 
and broadly tracked the UK growth in that quarter. This 
upwards revision has brought our forecast in line with our 
earlier forecast from June 2011, where we forecast 0.8% 
growth during 2011. In March 2011 we had forecast annual 
growth of 1.0% in 2011. Our forecast of 0.4% for 2012 is not 
inconsistent with one, or possibly two, quarters of negative 
through 2012. Indeed, we note that the Bank of England’s 
Governor, Mervyn King, had remarked on the possibility of a 
“zigzagging” phase for growth over the coming year. 
Continuing weakness in household consumption and 
investment are the key reasons for the downward revision. 
In November 2011, we forecast growth in 2013 of 1.6%, so 
our latest forecast is revised up slightly. This is the first 
instance that we have forecast growth in 2014. By then a 
significant recovery is expected to be present, with growth 
above trend. 
 
Our GVA forecasts are compared with the median of latest 
independent  forecasts for the UK in 2011, 2012 and 2013 
that are published by the UK Treasury. These show that we 
expect Scottish growth to continue to be weaker than the 
UK but growth in the two jurisdictions is now expected to be 
much closer together, in line with the evidence from the 
recovery to date. 
 
 
Table 2: Forecast Scottish Net Jobs Growth in Three Scenarios, 2011-2014 
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 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Upper 
 
-37,377        
 
-4,816 
 
47,244 
 
63,745 
 
November forecast 
 
11,150 
 
18,850 
 
41,100 
  
 
Central  
 
-40,401         
 
-15,988       
 
23,213 
 
38,023 
 
November forecast  
 
4,900 
 
8,750 
 
16,200 
  
 
Lower 
 
-43,437           
 
-27,695      
 
-1,853 
 
12,126 
November forecast -1,550 -1,350 -9,250   
 
 
 
Table 3:  ILO unemployment rate and claimant count rate measures of unemployment under each of the 
three forecast scenarios 2011-2014 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ILO unemployment 
   Rate (ILO un/TEA 16+) 8.6% 9.8% 9.3% 8.8% 
Numbers  231,200 265,250 253,950 234,300 
     
Claimant count      
    Rate (CC/CC+total job) 5.3% 6.1% 6.5% 6.1% 
Numbers   141,500  164,450  177,750  166,350 
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So, we are now forecasting growth of 0.7% in 2011, 
0.4% in 2012, 1.7% in 2013, and 2.6% in 2014. 
Given our previous forecast errors the lower and 
upper bounds for growth in 2011 are expected to be 
0.5% and 0.9%. for 2012, -0.1% and 0.9%, and for 
2013, 0.5% and 2.9%.  
 
Production and manufacturing output are projected 
to continue to be the main sectoral drivers of 
growth, with Production forecast to grow by 1% this 
year compared to service sector and construction 
growth of 0.3% which are  
largely flat-lining. In 2013, production continues to 
be the main sectoral driver of growth with growth of 
4%. Stronger growth is projected for services and 
construction of 1.1% apiece but the two sectors will 
still be recovering slowly. It is not until 2014 that we 
see much pick-up in growth, a year later than 
previously forecast. GDP is forecast to rise by 2.6%, 
while production growth rises appreciably to 6%, 
service sector growth moves up to 1.9% and the 
growth of construction GVA reaches 1.7%. 
 
One significant implication of these GVA forecasts 
is that they suggest that overall Scottish GDP will 
not return to its pre-recession peak - the level of 
GDP the economy was at just  before it went into 
recession - until the third quarter of 2014, just in 
time for the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow 
(23rd July to 3rd August 2014). That is, six years 
after the recession began. 
 
 
Employment Forecasts 
Table 2 presents our forecasts for net employee 
jobs for the 4 years 2011 to 2014 in terms of a 
central and upper and lower forecasts. 
 
Table 2 indicates that our year-end employee jobs 
forecast have been reduced further from the 
forecasts presented in the November Commentary. 
The lower forecasts reflect the weaker than 
expected outcomes in the labour market in the final 
quarter of last year, data revisions and the reduced 
forecast for GVA in 2012. On the central forecast, 
net jobs grow by -1.8% in 2011, -0.7% in 2012, 
1.0% in 2013 and by 1.7% in 2014. The number of 
employee jobs in Scotland is forecast to decline 
during 2012 by just less than 16,000 jobs. Within 
the sectors, however, we are forecasting a 
reduction in jobs in the service sectors of over 
sixteen thousand jobs. Public sector reductions in 
employee jobs are forecast to be around 7 
thousand over the year. We are also forecasting 
reductions in jobs in Retail and Wholesale but 
increases in employment in the Business Services 
sector. Through 2013 and 2014 we forecast 
increases in employee jobs in our central forecast, 
with annual increases of over 23 thousand and 38 
thousand respectively. There are job increases 
across all the main sectors. However, as in 2012 we 
forecast a “rebalancing” of employment within the 
services sectors towards non-public activities as 
fiscal consolidation continues. Construction 
employment is forecast to increase in 2013 and 
2014 as spending on (private) investment projects 
returns with renewed confidence in the recovery. 
 
Unemployment Forecasts 
The key unemployment forecasts are summarised 
in Table 3 . 
 
The ILO rate is our preferred measure since it 
identifies those workers who are out of a job and 
are looking for work, whereas the claimant count 
simply records the unemployed who are in receipt 
of unemployment benefit. It appears from the latest 
data that employment growth has been weaker in 
Scotland than other regions, reducing the pull of 
labour into employment. Our forecast for 
unemployment on the ILO measure at the end of 
2012 is now 265,250, up 34 thousand from the level 
seen at the end of 2011. As with our last forecast, 
we are expecting the unemployment position to 
improve through 2013, and are now forecasting 
unemployment at the end of that year of 253,950.  
We are forecasting that the rate of unemployment at 
the end of 2012 will be 9.8%, up significantly from 
our earlier forecasts. However, as previous quarters 
have demonstrated there is considerable 
uncertainty around the unemployment forecast due 
to the extent to which output change map into job 
change, changes in working population and 
independent variations in activity rates. In addition, 
we note the uncertainty around some of the 
employment estimates. We are concerned that 
some of the reported employee jobs series e.g. the 
series for Health, social work and care sector,  may 
overestimating the growth through 2011. If these 
are subject to later downward revision then 
employment levels could be much worse than our 
current statistics suggest. 
 
 
 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
24 February 2012 
 
 
____________________ 
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